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ABSTRACT: The article investigates the relation between praxeology and history in 
the critique Mises directs at the possibility of the long-term existence of a socialist 
commonwealth. We argue that Mises makes no clear distinction between the 
praxeological concept of 'private property' (associated with the possession of means of 
production) and the historical concept of the ideal-type 'private property' (associated 
to property rights – see HODGSON, 2015). The lack of precision between the 
theoretical and the historical concepts of private property prevents Mises’s critique 
from being an 'exact law', as he would have it. Finally, we show in the last section the 
consequences for Mises’s critique of socialism of having a historical and a praxeological 
concept of private property. 
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TENSÕES ENTRE TEORIA E HISTÓRIA NA 
CRÍTICA DE VON MISES AO SOCIALISMO
RESUMO: O artigo investiga a relação entre a praxeologia e a história na crítica que 
von Mises dirige à possibilidade da existência de socialismo no longo prazo. 
Argumentamos que Mises não faz uma distinção clara entre o conceito praxeológico 
de “propriedade privada” (associado com a posse dos meios de produção) e o conceito 
histórico do ideal-tipo “propriedade privada” (associado aos direitos de propriedade 
– ver HODGSON, 2015). Esta falta de precisão entre o conceito teórico e o histórico 
de propriedade privada faz com que a crítica de Mises ao socialismo não obedeça ao 
estatuto de uma “lei exata” como ele gostaria. Por fim, mostramos na última seção as 
consequências para a crítica de Mises ao socialismo de termos um conceito histórico e 
outro praxeológico de propriedade privada. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Mises; socialismo; cálculo socialista; crítica. 
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TENSIONS BETWEEN THEORY AND HISTORY IN VON MISES’S CRITIQUE OF SOCIALISM 
Ludwig von Mises, along with F. A. Hayek, can be considered one of the most important 
Austrian economists of the generation which succeeded Menger, Wieser and Böhm-
Bawerk in the first half of the 20th century. As Rothbard (1991) remarks, Mises’s and 
Hayek’s contributions to economic thought are intertwined with the debate of 
calculation under socialism that began in the 1920’s (with Mises’s contribution 
beginning precisely in 1920) and lasts until today1, although with different (and more 
multifarious) emphases. 
Nowadays, von Mises has a strong following, both abroad and in Brazil2, and his 
critique of socialism is recognized as not only previous to that of Hayek, but also as 
more fundamental (HOPPE, 1996) according to some Austrians. The extent to which 
Mises’s contributions to the socialist calculation debate can be ‘dehomogenized’ from 
that of Hayek (SALERNO, 1993) needs not to concern us here. The development of the 
debate and the refutations coming from economists from other schools (such as 
Marxists and neoclassics) are also not dealt with in this paper. Our objective here is to 
analyze Mises’s critique of socialism in his own terms, following a line of argument 
begun by Caplan (2004, 2005), but with a different angle: the relation between theory 
and history throughout Mises’s oeuvre. The reason for adopting this angle is the 
importance Mises himself attributes to history. Most of his followers usually underline 
the merits of praxeology, not paying much attention to the central role history plays in 
Mises’s writings3– a role, which can be corroborated by the fact that Mises wrote an 
almost 400-page long opus wholly devoted to Theory and History, published in 1957. 
In fact, even in his magnum opus Human Action (1949, ch. 2) and in his Epistemological 
Problems of Economics (1933, ch. 2 and 3 mainly), the methodological problems 
coming from the relation between theory and history come to the fore. His battle 
against the members of the German historical school in the 1920’s and 1930’s may give 
the impression that Mises downplays the role of history in the development of the 
social sciences and in the applications of economics, in particular. It is one of the 
objectives of this paper to show this is not true. 
1 See Barbieri (2004) and Albuquerque (2012) for an overview.
2 There is a Mises Institute located in Auburn, Alabama (USA) since 1982, with a branch in Brazil. Since 
2012 there has been an annual meeting of Austrian economics in Brazil, organized by the Mises Institute.
3 In the 1985 edition of Mises’s Theory and History, Murray Rothbard remarks, in the Preface of the book, 
how Mises’s “last great work (...) has made remarkably little impact, and has rarely been cited even by 
young economists of the recent Austrial revival”. Despite the fact that Rothbard Preface is now 30 years 
old, no systematic and in-depth investigation of Mises’s position regarding the relation between theory 
and history has been carried out so far, to the best of our knowledge.
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More precisely, the central aim of this paper is to show that Mises’s insightful 
contributions to the relation between theory and history do not spare him from 
developing a hidden tension (which is not necessarily a contradiction or an 
inconsistency, as we will explain in section 4) between them. This tension surfaces 
mainly when he deals with concrete phenomena, as when he criticizes the possibility 
of the long-term existence of a socialist commonwealth. In other words, the hypothesis 
put forth by the paper is that the logical chain of argumentation that Mises presents to 
deduce the impossibility of monetary calculation under a socialist central government 
rests, firstly, on an ideal-type category (‘private property’), in Max Weber’s sense, and 
not on an action category (which could be considered purely logical and not historical). 
This means that his theoretical deduction rests on a historical concept (‘private 
property’), which makes his deduction contingent and not exact. In the second place, 
the type of individual action more coherent with the ideal-type ‘private property’ is 
purposive-rational action, again in Weber’s sense. In other words, actions that Weber 
classifies as valuational, traditional or emotional (and which Mises reduces to equally 
rational) do not necessarily cohere with the ideal-type 'private property', contrary to 
what Mises might have hinted at. 
In order to carry out our objectives in the paper, we will structure it in three central 
sections (plus this Introduction and the Concluding Remarks). In the second section, we 
will present Mises’s view of the relation between theory and history, mainly in his 
discussion with Weber in chapter 2 of Epistemological Problems of Economics. It will be 
argued that Mises’s methodological discussions are a consequence of problems that were 
not properly solved in the Methodenstreit of the 1880’s. Despite recognizing Weber’s 
contributions to the discipline of history as valid and necessary, Mises clearly demarcates 
the frontier between history and praxeology, arguing that the latter (as a logical, formal 
science of human action) should logically precede the former (as a science of the 
comprehension (Verstehen) of empirical human action). However, without history 
(which he understands in a Weberian sense) Mises recognizes that praxeology would be 
only a formal discipline (like mathematics and logic), with little practical significance. 
In section three, we will present Mises’s critique of socialism, pointing to the fact 
that his deduction of the impossibility of calculation should be based exclusively in 
praxeological categories to be theoretically exact. However, that is not the case, because 
‘private property’ is an ideal type. If this argument is correct, then Mises’s (praxeo)
logical argument against the impossibility of calculation under socialism cannot be 
said to have a status of an exact law, but of a historical regularity, which can be held 
true with a certain degree of probability. Moreover, it is not any kind of rational action, 
which can be associated exactly with the ideal type ‘private property’: if the action is 
valuational, emotional or traditional, then it is doubtful whether it is always and 
everywhere compatible with ‘private property’. 
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Finally, in section 4, it is suggested that the tension between history and theory 
identified in the previous sections can be classified and broken down into three mains 
categories: ‘contradiction\inconsistency between historical fact and theoretical 
explanation’ and ‘exact theoretical law’ are extreme cases, and ‘tension between history 
and theory’ is a middle category. This tension will depend on the stretch of historical 
time under consideration and the institutional changes which are likely to happen 
therein. For example, if Mises’s critique of socialism were confined to the late 1910’s 
and early 1920’s, it may be coherent to picture it as constituting an 'exact law'. However, 
if we move forward many decades into the twenty-first century, institutional changes 
in the way one conceptualizes ‘property’ (and its correlates ‘property rights’ and 
‘private property’) make Mises’s critique less likely to hold. In other words, the tension 
between history and theory increases, so that the passage of historical time weakens 
the generality of the law. 
In the Concluding Remarks and Future Research, we suggest that Mises’s case and 
our results can help illuminate the relationship between markets and socialism, once we 
understand that the concepts of private and communal property are not only logical, but 
historical. One usually thinks about capitalism and markets as so closely linked that the 
abolishing of capitalism would automatically entail the abolishing of markets – one even 
talks about ‘market capitalism’, as if markets and capitalism were one and the same. Our 
contention is that the relationship between markets and capitalism is historical, and not 
logical. Capitalism cannot survive without markets, sure; but markets can exist without 
capitalism – in fact, they have existed long before capitalism appeared in late 18th century. 
Maybe they can also exist beyond capitalism, in the future. 
1. MISES, WEBER AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE METHODENSTREIT
1.1 THE AFTERMATH OF THE METHODENSTREIT FOR MISES
Usually one caricatures the Methodenstreit as a bitter disagreement between the 
Austrian Carl Menger and the German Gustav von Schmoller in 1883-1884 regarding 
the proper method of investigation for the social sciences. This 'battle of methods' had 
also an English version, between the first marginalists (Jevons and Edgeworth) and 
economists of a more historical bent, like Cliffe Leslie and John Ingram. However, this 
episode in the history of economic thought was short-lived, since the publication of 
both Marshall’s Principles and John Neville Keynes’s treatise on methodology (The 
Scope and Method of Political Economy) in 1890 apparently separated both sides (the 
institutional separation happened only in the 20th century). In other words, in less than 
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a decade, the proper role for history and theory had apparently been found and there 
was no need for further discussion – at least in English speaking countries.  
Nevertheless, when one reads 1933’s Epistemological Problems of Economics by 
Mises, the impression one gets is rather different. In some of the chapters, it seems that 
the battle was still raging. “The battle of the proponents of historicism against the 
nomothetic science of human action was absurd and preposterous”, affirms Mises, as 
if the matter was still in dispute in the 1920’s. And, in fact, the publication of the third-
generation German historicist Werner Sombart’s Die Drei Nationalökonomien, in 
1930, was object of a harsh criticism by Mises in chapter 3 of his 1933 book. Of course, 
by the 1930’s, the original formulation of the problem as a simplistic opposition 
between German historicist induction vs. Austrian abstract deduction had long been 
abandoned, as Heinz D. Kurtz, in Steedman (1995, ch. 2), observes. A proof of this is 
the fact that a Conference of German speaking economists, which took place in 1932, 
in the German city of Dresden, saw a great deal of agreement between historicists and 
marginalists. This agreement testifies to the overcoming of the initial terms of the 
Methodenstreit. In 1932, reports Kurtz, both historicists and marginalists could agree 
that pure theory is important for the development of economic science. Both could 
also agree on adopting the theory of marginal utility, as a leading figure of the young 
historical school, Arthur Spiethoff (apud HEINZ, p. 68) declared. The problem then, 
was no longer a dispute about the proper theory of value, since it seemed that only 
Marxists and Ricardians clung to the labour theory of value by the 1930’s. Yet, it seems 
that in Mises’s 1933 view, the debate was still not over. So what was the problem?
The problem seems to rest in finding generality and universality for the propositions 
of economics. This point goes beyond the admission that deduction and induction 
were important for a meaningful economic theory. The important point here seems 
how to overcome the problem of the historical specificity of the social sciences, as 
Hodgson (2001) put it. In other words, economics, like any modern science, aims at 
finding universal laws and general propositions. However, the method a social scientist 
should use to find these supposed universal laws must be different from the method of 
the natural sciences. For example, if a chemist identifies and measures the properties 
of a substance like carbon (e.g., its electronegativity or density), he or she can be sure 
that this property holds independent of time and space, given certain initial conditions 
that could, in principle, be controlled in an environment like a laboratory. Unfortunately, 
the same procedure is not available to the social scientist.
Beginning with Karl Knies (a professor of Max Weber’s and member of the older 
historical school), the problem identified by historicism is that humans are not only 
biological living beings, but also possess a subjectivity and a culture which changes in 
time. As a consequence, the ‘laws’ that govern the behavior of human subjects must 
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also change in time, at least to some extent. In other words, the laws that govern the 
physical world are of a different nature from the ‘laws’ that govern human behavior. 
Social objects (e.g., money, interest rates, and governments) depend on the common, 
shared beliefs of the members of a specific society in order to exist and endure in time. 
If these shared beliefs change, so can the social objects change. If that is so, there is 
definitely a problem for the social sciences: in principle, they should, like any other 
science, aim at universal, general laws. However, the behavior of humans in society 
cannot be studied like substances in chemistry of physics, be it because they are not 
amenable to controlled experiments, be it because humans possess a subjectivity that 
depends on time, space and nationality. The challenge put forth by historicism – and 
which Mises tries to answer in 1933 – is well put by Knies in the passage below: 
In opposition to the absolutism of theory, the historical conception of political 
economy rests upon the fundamental principle that the theory of political economy, 
in whatever form we find it, is, like economic life itself, a product of historical 
development; that it grows and develops in living connection with the whole social 
organism, out of conditions of time, space and nationality (...) the absolutism of 
theory (...) exists only as the offspring of time, and marks but a stage in the historical 
development of political economy (...). (apud PALGRAVE, 2015, p. 277)
Here is, in a nutshell, the tension between theory and history that Mises will find 
some eight decades after Knies published his book in 18534. This passage contrasts 
well with the Enlightenment progressive and universalist view of knowledge coming 
from countries like France (Voltaire, Rousseau), Scotland (Smith and Hume) and 
Germany (from Kant to Hegel). Instead of seeing modernity as the stage where 
humanity finally found at least the way to reach universal knowledge (which Knies 
critically defines as the ‘absolutism of theory’), the romantic heritage of German 
economic thought sees this universality as only ‘a stage in the historical development’ 
of political economy. Universalism is not the end-point of humanity towards reason, 
but it is son and heir of a given culture and time. It may change or even disappear in 
the future. However, if this is true, then we should be skeptical regarding the universality 
of human behavior. This is precisely the challenge that Mises faces: to find a universal 
law for the behavior of humans without letting go of the concrete historicity of really 
existing human societies. But how does he go about this challenge?
4 Die Politische Ökonomie vom Standpunkt der Geschictliche Methode (The Political Economy from the 
Standpoint of the Historical Method). 
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1.2 MISES’S SOLUTION: THE THEORY OF THE HUMAN ACTION
First of all – and in order to fend off the menaces of skepticism and relativism – Mises 
holds on to an unchanging concept of reason – as he puts it, “(...) none of the sources 
of historical information accessible to us contains anything that could shake the 
assumption of the immutability of reason” (1933, p. 111). The idea that reason could 
change in time – be it in a historicist fashion or in a dialectical manner, Hegel-style – 
must be excluded from the start. Reason is the same everywhere and for everyone 
(disregarding cases of mental disability or the like). This is the anchor to which one 
should cling in order to find a universal law for the behavior of humans. As one can 
see, this faith in reason has a Cartesian flavor and, as we will presently see, will also be 
peppered with a Kantian flavor. 
 By introducing the central concept of ‘action’ – more precisely, of rational 
human action – Mises will try to provide a benchmark whence all the sources of 
historical information could be assessed and evaluated. One of the contentions that 
Menger raised against Schmoller in the Methodenstreit was precisely the fact that, 
without prior theoretical concepts, the data collected by the historian can be organized 
in many a different corpora, being prone to state logical fallacies and making it difficult 
to analyze their claims for validity (see HODGSON, 2001, p. 79 and ff.). By saying that 
humans act, and act purposefully, trying to reach a state of affairs which suits them 
better than the state of affairs they are at a given moment, Mises effectively proposed a 
solution to the problem of separating theory and history5. 
First of all, it must be noted that Mises’s concept of action is not only a priori, but 
also synthetic (here we can see his debt to Kant, as Hoppe (1995, p. 17 and ff.) shows). 
Therefore, the concept of ‘human action’ is not attached to any concrete, specific 
human behavior. In fact – and that is the gist of Mises’s Kantian contribution – the 
concept of action serves as a bridge between the subjective plan of the agents and the 
causal behavior they exhibit in concrete objective reality. As in Kant’s first Critique, the 
concept of ‘human action’ works as a schema through which one can fit the whole 
range of concrete human activities. Using this concept, the actual action of a capitalist 
entrepreneur who tries to maximize one’s profits can be understood as purposeful in 
the same manner as the action of a revolutionary, which aims to bring down the 
5 As he puts is: “The laws of sociology [another name for praxeology, for Mises] are neither ideal types nor 
average types. Rather, they are the expression of what is to be singled out of the fullness and diversity of 
phenomena from the point of view of the science that aims at the cognition of what is essential and neces-
sary in every instance of human action. (...) They are rather a generalization of the features to be found in 
the same way in every single instance to which they refer” (1933, p. 98). 
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capitalist regime. And so is the action of a tribesman who, for example, sacrifices one’s 
physical well-being (or even one’s own life) in the name of a god. All of these actions 
are rational and causal in the sense that they try to move the agents who engage in 
them from a previous state of affairs A to a more suitable future state of affairs B. Of 
course, the suitability of the state of affairs B will depend on the actual values of the 
agent. Therefore, theory gives us the forms in which the historical concrete actions fit. 
They are separated, but dependent on one another.
Secondly, and because of the fact that human action does not refer to any specific 
behavior, values are equally separated from the actions necessary to attain these 
ultimate values. To put it a bit differently, Mises presupposes in his theory that means 
and ends (values) are also separated. For instance, to sacrifice your own life in a 
magical ritual or to eat healthy food to prolong your life are different ends whose 
satisfaction demand different means. The economist investigates how a purposeful 
agent deploys the available means to attain these ends, and that is pretty much all there 
is to it. In other words, theory should be neutral regarding the ends of human action. 
It should be useful to understand the altruistic behavior of Mother Theresa or the 
greedy behavior of an entrepreneur, or even the choices a violent warlord must make 
in order to increase one’s power. The kinds of values each of them has are absolutely 
different, but once we know the ends at which each of them is aiming, we can logically 
deduce – and deduce exactly – the kind of behavior and the means they will deploy. If 
they, in reality, do not adopt either the behavior or the means deduced by the economist, 
the historian must come in to help understand which empirical disturbing factors 
prevented the deduced action to actually take place. In fact, it is only when the historian 
identifies precisely the values and ends in a given context that the deductions of the 
economists can be said to hold concretely, instead of only being valid in the abstract6. 
1.3 PROBLEMS WITH MISES’S PRAXEOLOGY
Despite Mises’s ambitious claim to have established an a priori theory of human action 
– which he will call ‘sociology’ until the mid-1930’s and then ‘praxeology’ until the end 
of his life7 – Mises’s theoretical and methodological proposal did not go unchallenged. 
6 It is clear in this paragraph how Mises influenced Lionel Robbins’s 1932 Essay. However, he always set 
himself apart from the idea of economics as a mathematical or statistical science (like later neoclassics) or 
history as something like cliometrics.
7 Notice again that Mises uses until the 1930’s the expression ‘sociology’ to refer to the science that studies 
purposeful human action, so that Mises’s usage of the term has nothing to do with its modern use.  Ac-
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We will now present two of the criticisms, which will help us identify more precisely 
what we mean by ‘tension’ between history and theory for Mises.  
The first criticism comes from Mises’s Austrian colleague, F. A. Hayek, but can also 
be attributed to Marxists and institutionalists. Starting in the 1937 article on Economics 
and Knowledge and moving to 1943’s The Facts of the Social Sciences, Hayek disagrees 
with Mises regarding the a priori status of the propositions in economics. Hayek 
concedes that for an acting individual, the praxeological method is indeed sound. 
When we study the market, however, what we study are not only the actions of isolated 
individuals, but of interacting ones. If that is the case, the nature of the interaction 
among the individual changes the pattern of behavior of the aggregate – the market. 
For Hayek, praxeology stops being a priori the moment it takes into consideration the 
interactions of individuals. From then on, it must perforce be empirical. Since social 
interactions constrain and influence the ends individuals go after, it is only by studying 
these interactions that we will be able to determine how individuals will use means 
rationally so as to attain their ends. 
It is possible to retort to this objection stating that the fact that praxeology studies 
the behavior of individuals does not mean that this behavior is not influenced by social 
values and interactions. It is just that the study of values and interactions among 
individuals is beyond the scope of economics. Mises never denies that values and 
interactions influence individual behavior. Just as an example, when discussing the 
theme of history, he says that “an individual is at any instant of his life the product of 
all the experiences to which his ancestors were exposed plus those to which he himself 
has so far been exposed” (1957, p. 159). As this passage clarifies, Mises does not think 
that real individuals are Robinson Crusoe types. His point is that there must be a 
science to study “human valuations and volitions”, from a historical-psychological 
point of view. He terms this science thymology (1957, ch. 12). History, for its turn, also 
studies human action: it describes a posteriori “the conditions under which people 
lived and the way they reacted to these conditions” (1957, p. 159). That individuals 
interact concretely and, as an emergent property, form collective values which feed 
back into their actions, is not strange to Mises. What is strange to him is to attribute to 
economics the investigation of these phenomena. 
We can concede this point to Mises, sure. But we may also wonder about the price 
he pays with this strict separation between economics, history and thymology. Because 
Mises never used anything like a theory of emergent properties or a variant of 
cording to him, economics was, at that time, the most developed branch of sociology. 
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catastrophe theory8 to account for the emergence (or debacle) of institutions caused by 
the interactions of purposeful individuals, he seems to face a dilemma: 
i) He can either use exclusively a priori pure categories of action (Mises exemplifies 
them as value, cost, price, wealth, exchange and means of exchange – none of 
which should refer specifically to concrete economic phenomena9) to make 
exact deductions of economic phenomena. This vindicates his separation 
between history and economics; or 
ii) He can use categories that emerge from the interaction of individuals in order 
to make deductions, categories like markets, governments etc. Because these 
categories only exist depending on the interaction of individuals, deductions 
which use them are no longer exact, but subject to a probability. There is a 
tension between the generality of the propositions of praxeology and the 
specificity of the description of historical categories. It is as if there were a 
trade-off between the generality of the theory and the specificity of history. 
This tension consists of the second criticism one can level against Mises’s 
praxeological method – and that is how Max Weber sees the problems of abstraction 
in the social sciences. For the latter, “[t]he more 'general', i.e., the more abstract, the 
laws, the less they accomplish for the requirements of the causal imputation of 
individual phenomena and, thereby, indirectly, for the understanding of the meaning 
of cultural events” (apud MISES, 1933, p. 105). Mises, of course, disagrees: for him, 
abstract praxeological concepts mirror the structure of the actual actions humans 
must perform to reach their actual objectives, so they are not far away from concrete 
reality. In order to reduce the four ideal-types of action Weber constructs (rational, 
valuational, emotional and traditional) to just purposive-rational action, Mises gives 
concrete examples of how they all fit his definition of purposeful behavior (1933, p. 90 
ff.). He shows how people who act out of the intrinsic value of an action, or who 
traditionally follow the same routine for years or, finally, who act on the basis of 
8 It should be clear that Mises does not approve of the import of terms from the natural sciences to the so-
cial sciences, as we did just above. Our point, however, serves only to highlight how a higher-order object 
can emerge from the lower-level interaction of individuals. The properties of this new object may not be 
reducible to those of the interacting individuals, something that, in our view, should call for a qualifica-
tion of the universal validity of praxeological propositions. 
9 We may also wonder about the extent to which categories like 'wealth' and 'means of exchange' can be 
classified as a priori. If price, cost, value can arguably be imputed in a universal way to individual actions, 
the same may not be said of concepts which seem sociohistorical, like wealth and means of exchange. 
Mises himself gives no justification for the a priorism of these concepts. We will talk more about this 
problem in the next section.
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emotional impulses all act purposively: they all supposedly try to reach a more suitable 
state than the one they are in. Therefore, in principle, there should be no difference 
between these four ideal-typical actions, according to Mises. They are all modulations 
of the same abstract, a priori concept of human action.
Despite sounding convincing, this argument still raises doubts. The first one 
concerns what we may call the institutional context in which each of the four ideal-
type Weberian actions could thrive. Because Weber’s investigations are historical, his 
ideal-types are constructed by means of logically abstracting the most relevant aspects 
of a great deal of individual phenomena dispersed in history. This is how Weber 
discovers that some epochs and societies are characterized by more emotional, or 
valuational, or traditional or rational-purposive behavior. If it is true that an emotional 
and a purposive-rational action have the same logical structure, it is not clear if they 
could both be abstracted away from the same social milieu in a historical investigation. 
As we will try to show in the next section, it is more likely that a purposive-rational 
action flourish in a market society with well-defined property rights. Again, we can 
spot here a tension between abstract actions as seen by theory and action as abstracted 
historically by means of ideal-types. 
The second doubt regarding Mises’s reduction of Weber’s historical ideal-types is 
related to the status of the means-ends relation in traditional or valuational actions. In 
both of them, means and ends intermingle, because the objective of the action is not to 
reach for a more suitable state (say, going from state A to B), but to keep in the state the 
agent is already in (staying in A). However, if the agent does not want to move from a 
less suitable state to a more suitable one, he or she does not act, according to Mises – 
unless one defines action negatively, as making an effort not to move. 
If our observations above make sense, the deductions of praxeology are exact only 
in the case of individual behavior, where the social milieu is taken as given. Whenever 
history passes and\or there is a change in the social milieu, the deductions of praxeology 
cannot be said to be exact. This does not mean they are false – however, they cannot 
claim the status of universality which Mises wanted to give them. The next section will 
try to show that this is the case with Mises’s critique of socialism. 
2. PRAXEOLOGY, HISTORY AND THE CRITIQUE OF SOCIALISM.
No doubt, many Austrians pride themselves on the achievements of praxeology. Right 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and one year before the disintegration of the USSR, 
Mises’s and Hayek’s contributions to the problem of economic calculation in socialism 
were being lauded as finally proven correct. In the postscript for the 1990 edition of 
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Mises’s classic The Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth (henceforth 
ECSC), Joe Salerno writes that 
(...)Ludwig von Mises demonstrates, once and forever, that, under socialist central 
planning, there are no means of economic calculation and that, therefore, socialist 
economy itself is 'impossible' ('unmöglich')—not just inefficient or less innovative or 
conducted without benefit of decentralized knowledge, but really and truly and lite-
rally impossible. (1990, p. 49)
Really and truly and literally impossible. These are strong words indeed, if they are 
correct – and at the beginning of the 1990’s they sure must have sounded correct, along 
with the theory which provided those results. Mises himself put great faith in the 
achievements of economic theory since Adam Smith’s time – in fact, he believed that 
praxeology was the method  actually advanced by economists since the beginning of 
the 19th century. His point was that praxeology had not been precisely defined until the 
beginning of the 20th century – and this lack of clarity had paved the way for a lot of 
misunderstandings and fallacies coming from Marxists, institutionalists and 
historicists. For example, he criticizes Weber for not recognizing the universal validity 
of the propositions of praxeology. “The economic principle, the fundamental law of 
the formation of exchange ratios, the law of returns, the law of population (...) are valid 
always and everywhere if the conditions assumed by them are given” (1933, p. 92). The 
question is not only the difficulty in defining the conditions under which the universal 
laws of economics should hold – something that, in the social realm, should give us 
enough difficulty. The problem is rather the logical status of economic concepts like 
‘exchange ratio’ or ‘returns’. Contrasting with Weber, ‘exchange’ was certainly a logical 
concept, an abstraction built from the observation of a myriad of historical cases; in 
short, it was an ideal-type. As such, it was a limit-concept that could at best be used to 
causally explain analogous historical facts adequately. That is, an ideal type is neither 
an efficient nor a final cause. It could not be used as a pure a priori concept, like a 
mathematical or logical concept; one should consult history to know what an ‘exchange’ 
properly means.  
Our task in this and the next section is to assess the conditions of the so-called 
impossibility of socialism, as defined by Mises10, exploring the nature of the terms he 
uses to make his critique: are they really a priori or are they implicitly historical? 
10 Mises characterizes socialism right at the beginning of ECSC (p.1) as the economic organization of a 
commonwealth where the means of production are property of the community and the power to dispose 
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2.1 MISES’S ARGUMENT AGAINST SOCIALISM IN A NUTSHELL
Mises’s argument against the possibility of socialism appears in a few pages at the 
beginning of chapter 3 of his ECSC. He further developed it with 1922’s Socialism, 
which contains not only the original critique but also a refutation of the supposed 
inevitability of socialism and the idea of socialism as a moral imperative. As Mises 
understood it, socialism was not only impossible to be carried out in a large economy, 
but also represented a real threat to the conquests of modern western civilization. For 
this reason, Mises’s argument as presented in the 1920’s is not only logical, but also 
involves ethical imperative and historical examples. For him, it would be logically and 
historically possible to show that the capitalistic order is better than the socialistic one 
– at least for extended, modern societies.  For now, let us not dwell in Mises’s ethical 
and historical concerns. He held on to the logical gist of the argument in the following 
decades; the main difference is that he incorporated and responded to the criticisms of 
Marxists and neoclassics (see, for example, the final sections of chapter 26 of Human 
Action). To put it briefly, the argument goes as follows.
Starting with the universal fact that men act purposively, he investigates the kind 
of purposeful action one might find in a society in which there is no private property 
of the means of production. If there is no private property of the means of production, 
there can be no exchange between private owners of these means of production. In 
other words, it is impossible to find monetary prices for these means of production, 
since prices cannot reflect their relative scarcity for private agents. As a consequence, 
it is also impossible to make calculations and attribute to means of production a 
monetary value. Finally, the last conclusion is that a large economy could not be 
organized following the rules of a central government. 
In other words, once the division of labor reaches a point where no central 
authority could in principle identify and control the stages of the whole economic 
process, it would be irrational to try to centralize production, because a centralized 
bureau of statistics would inevitably fail to calculate relative prices for all the means of 
production in a large country. Mises inverts the Marxist argument for a temporary 
centralization and statization of the means of production as presented in part IV of 
1875’s Critique of the Gotha Program: this centralization would no longer be a step 
leading to a more organized and just society in a future communism. Quite the 
contrary: it would lead to a society in which the division of labor would constantly 
diminish, along with the material and technological progress of society. Without the 
of them are delegated to a ‘special body’ – be it a dictator or a group of people with this function.
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coordination by market prices of people’s different plans in an extended economy, 
people would not be able to purposefully act much beyond their immediate 
environment. Poverty would increase, and total wealth would decrease. The purposeful 
action of Marxist socialists like Lenin is shown to be logically fallacious: the costs of 
centralization would far exceed the benefits, so that its ends would be incompatible 
with the means proposed to attain it. 
Consequently, in order to deepen the progress of civilization, one should hold on 
the capitalist system, according to Mises. Since capitalism allows the existence of 
private property, there can be markets for intermediary goods like machines and other 
means of production. Through the operation of competitive and decentralized 
markets, the forces of demand and supply would purportedly produce visible prices 
which would allow for calculation and which, in turn, would reflect the relative scarcity 
of means of production. A purposeful actor may then coordinate one’s plans (albeit 
usually imperfectly, due to the prevailing uncertainty of a decentralized market 
economy) with the plans of other purposeful actors of whose ends they know nothing 
(or very little). Consequently, the apparent chaos of production of capitalism would 
paradoxically be less chaotic than the production in a socialist commonwealth, which 
would make more people poorer and the economy less dynamic.
As one can see, Mises’s chain of logical deduction uses, as main categories those 
of ‘private property’, ‘market’, ‘market prices’ (as signals of relative scarcity) and 
‘calculation’. Central in this chain is the category of ‘private property’, for it is the 
starting point of the whole rationale. Can it be considered a praxeological category? 
Mises is plainly aware that ‘private property’ is an historical concept. Both in Theory 
and History and in Human Action he clearly speaks of private property in a historical 
sense. Just as an example, he admits that “Private property is a human device. It is 
not sacred. It came into existence in early ages of history, when people with their 
own power and by their own authority appropriated to themselves what had 
previously not been anybody’s property” (1949, p. 679). He goes on to recognize that 
this process of appropriation was “arbitrary and violent” in the past. However, the 
point is not to identify the moment in history when this violent and arbitrary process 
was contained by the rule of law. The point is to identify a ‘catallactic’, a priori 
concept of ‘private property’. And, precisely, that is what he does in a passage in 
Human Action, when he admonishes us (in a section properly called “Private 
Property”) not to confuse the catallactic concept of property rights with its legal 
concept (p. 650). In our view, this distinction is crucial to the logical status of Mises’s 
deductions and their exactitude. A catallactic category of ‘private property’ would be 
a priori, and, therefore, amenable to praxeological analysis. The legal category 
should be studied a posteriori, by history. 
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The question then is to show the extent to which the category of ‘private property’ 
can be praxeological. Let us recall that Mises thinks that praxeology begins with 
individuals, because ‘only individuals act’. As we saw, they are not isolated Robinson 
Crusoes, but purposeful individuals who are influenced by the values of their own 
societies and their own time. Even so, categories such as ‘price’, ‘cost’ and ‘value’ can be 
properly classified as praxeological because they refer to individual actions. The fact 
that, in reality, they are influenced by historical factors does not diminish their logical 
status. The historian must tell us what these historical factors are so we should know 
the types of purposes a given individual, historically situated, might have. 
2.2 THE MEANING OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN POSSESSION AND  
PROPERTY FOR PRAXEOLOGY
One may wonder, however, if the category of ‘private property’ is on a par with the 
categories ‘prices’, ‘costs’ or ‘value’. If one takes ‘private property’ to mean ‘possession’, 
or the act of acquiring (peacefully or violently) an external object (and the services that 
it renders) by the acting individual, it seems fine to consider it a praxeological category. 
In fact, there is evidence that property as possession is hardwired in human individuals, 
as Stake (2004) shows. In this case, possessing something means to own it and to be 
capable to dispose of it the way one sees fit. But what about private property as a right 
that is constituted by the shared intentions and representations of acting agents11? In 
this case, it seems hard to hold on to the idea of a purely praxeological ‘private property’, 
since its very constitution emerges from an empirical process of interactions between 
agents, as Hayek would have it. ‘Private property’ cannot be understood from the 
action of individuals alone, even if those individuals are influenced by social values.  In 
this case, we must use history to understand how ‘private property’ emerged. In 
summary, one cannot always think of ‘private property’ as a praxeological category 
because it may be more than possession – it can emerge out of a given historical process 
of interacting individuals, as we pointed in section 2.3 above. 
Sure, an individual alone can mentally ‘calculate’ the ‘price’, ‘cost’ or value of an 
action, independent of any historical concept. Nevertheless, there is a twist to this 
argument when private property is understood as emerging historically from agent-
to-agent relations along with agent-to-external-object relations (that is, relations of 
11 The problem of intersubjectivity is not much studied in modern economics (an exception is FULLBROOK, 
2003). A good collection of essays that deal with the problem of collective intentionality form an analytical 
philosophical point of view is that of Schmitt (2003). 
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pure possession, which seem to be the ones Mises has in mind). As Hodgson (2014, 
2015) has recently explained, in order to differentiate the right of property from 
possession of an external object (and the services derived whence), we must move 
beyond the individual level and up to an institutional one.    
Moreover, one can argue that, depending on the kind of interaction between 
purposeful individuals, different kinds of institutions will emerge. It particular, the 
category of ‘private property’ is more likely to emerge when individuals act in a 
purposive-rational, self-interested way. For example, the classic essay by Hirschman 
(1977) shows how capitalism emerged simultaneously in history with the emergence 
of  the concept of interest understood as a calm and constant passion, which permitted 
predictability and the economic valuation of actions (here we can see how the 
widespread use of money in modern societies also emerged). Max Weber’s argument 
in the Protestant Ethic..., despite being of a different nature, can also be interpreted in 
this light: different shared beliefs (about predestination and the meaning of interest) of 
acting individuals in protestant sects are one condition for the emergence and 
consolidation in history of calculative practices and capitalist institutions in Western 
Europe.  
The upshot of the argument in this section is the following: Mises’s deduction of 
the impossibility of calculation under a socialist central government holds only if (i) 
we understand ‘private property’ as the possession of physical objects (and of the 
services that can be derived from it12) by individual agents and that this concept does 
not depend on the shared beliefs of the members of a social group to continue to exist; 
and (ii) the purposive action of agents is such that their behavior in valuing their 
actions can be calculated (as the expected or estimate outcome of costs and benefits of 
an action) and their actions should aim to take them to a more suitable state of affairs 
different from the one they are in.
If conditions 1 and 2 above do not hold, we cannot say that socialism is really and 
truly and literally impossible. This result, however, does not mean that it is immediately 
possible or that Mises is completely off the mark. In order to be possible, a future 
socialist community would have to develop shared beliefs and material practices 
regarding the mutual recognition of rules that define a centralized ‘communal 
property’ (as opposed to ‘private property’). It would also have to find and agree on a 
common, shared system of calculation of social benefits and costs (beyond that of a 
Pigou-inspired calculation system that just adds up private benefits and costs to arrive 
at a 'social' benefit or cost). But these are processes that happen in historical time and 
12 See Mises (1949, p. 678).
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produce historical concepts; they are not arrived at by means of praxeological 
deduction.  
As one can see, the double meaning of ‘private property’ may have impacts on 
Mises’s argument about the possibility of socialism as conceived by him. Our task in 
the next section is to show what these impacts are in more detail. 
3. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DUALITY OF MEANING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR MISES’S 
ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF SOCIALISM
Right after the publication of Mises’s Human Action, Murray Rothbard and George 
Schuller exchanged letters regarding a review of Mises’s book by Schuller in the 
American Economic Review in 1950. The substance of Schuller’s critique is related to 
the application of praxeological laws to historical events. In Schuller’s last rejoinder to 
Rothbard, in 1951, he declares that 
acceptance of Mises’s stated axioms does not necessarily imply acceptance of the 
‘principles’ or ‘applications to reality’ which he has drawn from them, even though 
his logic may be impeccable. When a logical chain grows beyond the limits set by 
stated assumptions, it uses unstated assumptions. The number of unstated assump-
tions (axioms, postulates, or other) in Human Action is enormous. (SCHULLER, 
1951, p. 188)
Schuller goes on to challenge Mises to rewrite his books in a formal way, using 
axioms and postulates. None of Mises’s followers has ever tried to do this, to our 
knowledge, even though that might greatly simplify the central message of the 900-
page strong Human Action. And, in fact, we would add that it is impossible to carry out 
this simplification, because, as we put in section 2.2, and as Schuller makes it clear in 
the passage above, there are numerous “unstated assumptions” in Human Action. Our 
own contribution to the debate lies in trying to show that these “unstated assumptions” 
do not always refer to praxeological categories, but sometimes to ideal-typical ones. If 
we are right, then it would be impossible to logically exhaust the theses of Human 
Action in axiomatic form, since ideal-types are logical constructions made out of 
historical material.
In order to organize the results of our investigation, we will present them in two 
separate subsections: one that details the consequences for socialism of a praxeological 
concept of private (and communal) property, and another showing the consequences 
for socialism of a historical, ideal-type concept of private (and communal) property. 
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3.1 CONSEQUENCES FOR SOCIALISM IN A PRAXEOLOGICAL APPROACH: IMPOSSIBILITY
As in a central planned socialism ‘one will alone acts’ - the dictator, according to Mises 
– and as we assume one physically possesses all means of productions, we can 
understand one’s action praxeologically. In chapter 15 of Socialism, Mises studies 
particular forms of socialism, admitting that the dictator need not act based exclusively 
on a purposive-rational basis: the dictator may be the leader of a military socialist 
commonwealth, a state socialist commonwealth, a Christian socialist commonwealth 
and so forth. In all cases, however, the use of praxeology is legitimate, since the action 
of the dictator can be understood as trying to reach a more suitable state starting from 
a less suitable one. As we have seen, the fact that the dictator has different ends in sight 
does not hamper Mises’s rationale for the failure of socialism presented in section 2.2. 
In all cases it would be impossible to calculate market prices with dire consequences 
for the commonwealth. 
By the same token, if I have private property (understood as possession), then the 
acts of individuals obey a praxeological deduction: we have markets for means of 
production, which have prices and which further the division of labor, making society 
progress. It is true that, if we have other types of action (emotional, valuational or 
traditional, associated with other kinds of values), we may not further the division of 
labor and have progress as much as we would have with a purposive-rational action. 
But in any case we will have markets, to a greater or lesser extent, and they will give 
people signs they need (in the form of prices, broadly conceived) in order to make the 
choices according to their different values. 
The situation is different, however, if we associate property not with physical 
possession but with property rights.  
3.2 CONSEQUENCES FOR SOCIALISM IN A HISTORICAL APPROACH: POSSIBILITIES
The historical, ideal-typical concept of property presents a more interesting case, as it 
highlights the fact that property rights centrally owned depend on the shared, 
intersubjective beliefs and practices of the members of community. This consequence 
echoes the relatively recent debate between Caplan (2002, 2005), Leeson and Boettke 
(2005) and Gonzalez and Stringham (2005). Caplan’s (2005) argument is that socialism 
did not fail empirically because of the impossibility of calculation, but because it could 
not align the incentives of individuals and those of the commonwealth. In fact, if we have 
(i) individuals who behave in a rational-purposive way; (ii) advances in technologies of 
calculation\computation that allow for the processing of necessary information about 
technology and tastes; and (iii) a shared and relatively stable metric for measuring social 
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and individual costs, socialism should be, in principle, possible13. The situation is not so 
likely if people behave in an emotional way or if ends and means are mixed, as is the case 
with valuational or traditional actions (see section 2.3 above for our argument). In this 
case, the investigation should combine a careful analysis of categories: some of them are 
properly praxeological; others should work as ideal types. As we defended in the 
Introduction, if we analyze long periods of time or if the institutional context is changing, 
then the deductions we make are growingly less likely to actually occur. 
Reviewing the recent debate on ‘market socialism’, Albuquerque (2012, ch. 6.3) 
points to the fact that socialism is not necessarily incompatible either with a stock 
exchange and small private firms (in the proposal of Roemer) or with self-managed 
firms, not unlike cooperatives (in the proposal of Bowles and Gintis) or still Burczak’s 
concept of a stakeholder society. It is not our purpose to discuss in detail any of these 
proposals, but to point to the fact that they are compatible with the existence of markets. 
If this is true, then we can have socialism and markets for intermediary goods14. Private 
property and socialism are no longer exclusive terms because private property can be an 
ideal-type, and not a praxeological category. Our deductions are not sure fire as they 
might be if we only operated with logical concepts, but they gain in practical and 
historical accuracy.  Of course, depending on the types of actions of private agents, the 
alignment of private and public incentives may be harder to achieve – people that are 
moved mainly by emotions may lead to unstable institutions, for example. But the central 
point is that market and socialism (as Mises understood it) need not be seen as 
incompatible bedfellows, as they were during most of the 20th century15. 
13 That is roughly the point of Lange and Taylor (1938) demonstration of the possibility of calculation in 
a socialist commonwealth using a Walrasian model. However, what has not been stressed in their Wal-
rasian demonstration is the concrete difficulty in finding an adequate technology of computation and 
a shared and stable metric for measuring social and private costs and benefits. This difficulty must be 
dealt within an institutional and historical approach, in our view, to be able to identify the institutional 
framework which can uphold this capacity of computation and of sharing a stable metric. 
14 It is noteworthy that, in a 1926 article on Interventionism, Mises admits that nationalization may not be 
considered intervention if it does not interfere with the operation of the market by coercing the producer 
to charge more or less for the product being offered (p. 19). Maybe Mises is hinting at the idea that incen-
tives to act in the market do not have a straight relation to property rights, as Caplan shows.
15 Corporatism may be a historical example of the combination of communal property of (some) means 
of production by a central authority and the functioning of markets. This is what happened (in different 
degrees) in the regime of Park Chung Hee (1962-1979), in South Korea, the Japanese model before 1973 
and the nazi and fascist regimes. 
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Marx may have identified the laws of tendency which would lead us to the end of 
capitalism, but gave us only sparse, fragmentary clues about what a future socialist (or 
even communist) society would look like. It is the merit of Mises to try to imagine 
what a future socialist society would look like. It is also worthy of merit that he tried to 
present his ideas in a logical, coherent way, always attentive to the proper method of 
investigation in the social sciences, and always aiming at general and universal 
knowledge about human action. Finally, it is equally praiseworthy the fact that he 
recognized the importance of history (in a Weberian sense) in the development of the 
social sciences.  As he put it, “no sociologist can do without history, and no historian 
can do without sociology” (1933, p. 116). 
However, his claims about the impossibility of socialism seem overrated, in our 
view. It is not true that “socialism is really and truly and literally impossible” – and we 
tried to demonstrate the error in this observation using Mises’s own terms regarding 
the importance of theory and history. There are not many academic investigations 
regarding the relation between theory and history in Mises. Our central claim in the 
paper is that Mises does not differentiate clearly between praxeological and ideal-
typical concepts. As a consequence, a tension between praxeological theory and 
historical ideal-types appear: deductions which are taken as ‘exact’ find no confirmation 
in history, and concepts that are historically constructed – private property associated 
with property rights being the most important for our argument – are taken as purely 
logical. We tried to disentangle the possible confusion regarding the concept of ‘private 
property’, showing that when this concept is historical, Mises’s logical deduction does 
not hold with certainty. We also presented the details of our argument, trying to 
separate the wheat from the chaff in Mises’s praxeological claims. In this way, we can 
understand George Schuller’s complaint in section 4 about the supposed empirical 
exactitude of Mises’s logical deductions. 
Finally, and contrary to the usual estrangement which characterizes the Austrian 
and Marxist traditions, we tried to point to some possible future avenues of research 
regarding the possible role of private property (historically and theoretically construed) 
in a socialist community. In our view, the usefulness of such discussion is to be able to 
think of socialism as a system that does not necessarily exclude markets. As we hinted 
at in the introduction, the view that socialism and markets are incompatible is usually 
linked to the view that capitalism and markets as so closely linked that the abolishing 
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of capitalism would automatically entail the abolition of markets16. However, even if 
we think of socialism as the Aufhebung of capitalism, that might not necessarily 
exclude markets – remember that one of the meanings of Aufheben is to keep, to save 
– so that the overcoming of capitalism might keep markets functioning (although in a 
different way). As we said, capitalism cannot survive without markets, sure; but 
markets can exist without capitalism – in fact, they have existed long before it. 
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